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The last decade has witnessed a revolution in ﬁnancial risk management.
Quantitative techniques such as option pricing, portfolio insurance, and
value at risk (VaR) have become essential tools of portfolio management.
The generalized use of these techniques, however, has raised concerns that
they could induce similar trading patterns, or “herding,” across banks us-
ing VaR systems to limit their risks. As the argument goes, some exogenous
shock to volatility could push VaR above the limit, forcing banks to liqui-
date their positions, further depressing falling prices.
If so, the generalized use of risk management systems could cause higher
volatility in times of stress, perversely making ﬁnancial markets less safe
than before. This could raise the prospect of systemic risk, which arises
when a shock threatens to create multiple simultaneous failures in ﬁnan-
cial institutions.
Various theories have been advanced to explain herding behavior. A nec-
essary precondition for herding is that investors within a group tend to buy
(or sell) when similar participants buy (or sell). This could reﬂect the belief
that other investors have superior information, as in informational cascade
theories.1Alternatively, another class of contagion theories emphasizes the
eﬀect of liquidity shocks, which force some market participants to liqui-
date their holdings to obtain cash, perhaps due to a call for additional
collateral.2 This applies to participants with high leverage, such as bank-
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1. See Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), Banerjee (1992), or more recently
Morris and Shin (1998). Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998) provide a useful survey
of contagion models based on information asymmetries.
2. See Kodres and Pritsker (2002).proprietary trading desks or hedge funds. The herding eﬀect due to VaR is
closest to this latter explanation. We can classify these herding theories
into “information-based” and “constraint-based” theories.
In practice, the VaR-induced herding eﬀect depends on commonalities
in the positions in ﬁnancial institutions. As Morris and Shin (1999, p. 141)
have stated, “One theme which has emerged in the subsequent debate on
the performance of the risk management systems has been the criticism
that many ﬁnancial entities entered the period of turbulence with very sim-
ilar trading positions.”
Thus, VaR herding requires similar positions across VaR-constrained
institutions. This study tests this hypothesis by investigating the ex ante
and ex post trading risk proﬁle of U.S. commercial banks, based on quar-
terly banking reports over the period 1995 to 2003. These reports contain
information on quarterly trading revenues broken down by risk factor cat-
egory as well as the overall VaR-based market risk charge. Using segment
information, broken down into ﬁxed income, currencies, equities, and com-
modities categories should prove useful to detect commonalities in posi-
tions. To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to do so.
Similar positions should be revealed by high correlations between banks’
trading revenues as well as between banks’ VaR measures. We also exam-
ine correlation patterns across risk categories to assess diversiﬁcation effects.
Finally, we examine the variance of aggregate trading returns from banks
in the sample and break it down into diﬀerent components to examine
diversiﬁcation eﬀects across the industry. As a by-product of the analysis,
this paper also evaluates the proﬁtability of bank trading revenues, thus
contributing to the literature on diversiﬁcation in banking.3
This paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides a review of VaR
and herding theories. Section 1.3 presents the empirical analysis, and sec-
tion 1.4 concludes.
1.2 VaR and Systemic Risk
In recent years, VaR has become a universally accepted benchmark for
measuring market risk. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS), for example, provides annual descriptions of market risk disclo-
sures by banks and securities houses. In 1993, only 5 percent of the sample
reported VaR information. By 2001, this proportion had gone up to 98 per-
cent. In addition to its role as a ubiquitous passive risk measure, VaR has
become a tool for the activemanagement of risk, including setting risk lim-
its and capital charges. Much of this development was spurred by regula-
tory standards for capital requirements.
30 Philippe Jorion
3. Stiroh (2004) provides a review of this literature. He shows that noninterest income has
increased in importance for U.S. banks and is much more volatile than traditional interest in-
come, based on accounting data.1.2.1 The VaR Capital Charge
The use of internal VaR models was oﬃcially sanctioned by the BCBS,
which amended the 1988 Basel Accord to include a charge for market risk
(BCBS 1995, 1996). Since January 1998, banks have had a choice between
using a standardized method, using predeﬁned rules, or their own internal
VaR measure as the basis for their capital charge for market risk. Because
in practice the internal-model approach leads to lower capital charges than
the standardized model, this has led to the generalized use of VaR methods.
To use the internal-model approach, a bank must ﬁrst satisfy various
qualitative requirements. The bank must demonstrate that it has a sound
risk-management system, which must be integrated into management de-
cisions. Notably, the bank has to use the regulatory VaR forecast directly
for management decisions. This point is important, as it forces commercial
banks to use the same parameters as dictated by the Basel rules.
When the qualitative requirements are satisﬁed, the market risk charge
is based on the following quantitative parameters for VaR: (1) a horizon of
ten trading days, or two calendar weeks, (2) a 99 percent conﬁdence inter-
val, and (3) an observation period based on at least a year of historical data
and updated at least once a quarter.4 In practice, banks are allowed to
compute their ten-day VaR by scaling up their one-day VaR by the square
root of 10.
The market risk charge (MRC) is then computed as the sum of a gen-
eral market risk charge and a speciﬁc risk charge (SRC). The latter repre-
sents the risk of individual issues that is not reﬂected in the general market
risk measure. The general market risk charge is taken as the higher of the
previous day’s VaR, or the average VaR over the last sixty business days,
times a multiplicative factor k:
(1) MRCt   Max k ∑
60
t 1
VAR t i, VARt 1    SRCt,
where kis to be determined by local regulators, subject to an absolute ﬂoor
of three.5 In practice, the ﬁrst term in the parentheses is binding because 
it is multiplied by a factor of at least three. Banks are also subject to a back-
test that compares the daily VaR to the subsequent proﬁt and loss (P&L).
Banks that fail the backtest can be subject to an increase in k from three
to four.6




Bank Trading Risk and Systemic Risk 31
4. More precisely, the average duration of historical observations must be at least six
months.
5. The speciﬁc risk charge is explained in more detail in the Basel Amendment (1996).
6. The backtesting procedure consists of matching daily VaR with the subsequent P&L. If
a loss exceeds the VaR, an exception is said to have occurred. Banks can have up to four ex-
ceptions over the previous year. Beyond four exceptions, k is increased progressively, subject
to the regulator’s evaluation of the cause for the exception, and reaches four for ten or more
exceptions.equity capital that the bank must carry as protection against market risk.
It can be viewed as a measure of economic capital to support the trading
activities.
1.2.2 The VaR Vicious Circle Hypothesis
Some recent literature has emphasized the limitations of VaR. VaR is a
single summary measure of downside loss. Because VaR only represents
one quantile of the P&L distribution, it gives no indication about the tail
loss, beyond the quantile. In theory, traders could willfully attempt to game
their VaR limit by altering the distribution of P&L to satisfy a ﬁxed VaR at
the expense of a small probability of large losses.7
Other authors argue that widespread use of VaR could actually increase
systemic risk. The novel aspect of the Basel market risk charge is that, for
the ﬁrst time, it creates capital requirements that are risk sensitive. The in-
ternal model approach was put into operation in January 1998. It so hap-
pened that 1998 was a tumultuous year.
The Russian default of 1998 triggered turbulences in ﬁnancial markets
that eventually led to the collapse of the hedge fund Long-term Capital
Management (LTCM). In the search for culprits, ﬁngers have pointed to
the generalized use of risk measures such as VaR. Some observers claimed
that the application of strict VaR limits led to position-cutting by traders,
which put additional downward pressures on prices. These claims have
been advanced by Dunbar (2000) in his book on LTCM, by Persaud (2000),
and have also been echoed in the press. Likewise, Scholes (2000, p. 20)
states that “banks and ﬁnancial entities . . . add to the volatility in ﬁnan-
cial crises.”
The argument is that some shock in volatility, say due to the Russian de-
fault, increases the VaR of outstanding positions. In 1999, The Economist
(June 10; pp. 65–66) has argued that, as VaR goes up, a “bank is then faced
with two choices: put in extra capital or reduce its positions, whatever and
wherever they may be. This is what happened last autumn.” As the argu-
ment goes, several banks could sell the same asset at the same time, creat-
ing higher volatility and correlations, which exacerbates the initial eﬀect,
forcing additional sales. This VaR “vicious circle” hypothesis is described
in ﬁgure 1.1. The troubling conclusion is that VaR tools increase volatility
and are inherently dangerous.8
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7. See for instance Ju and Pearson (1999) for an analysis at the trader’s level. Basak and
Shapiro (2001) examine the eﬀect of this gaming at the level of the institution on ﬁnancial
markets. They show that strict VaR limits could induce banks to take on more risk in bad
states of the world, that is, after VaR limits have been breached, which could cause higher
volatility in ﬁnancial markets. On the other hand, Cuoco and Liu (2006) argue that the VaR
limit should be implemented on a dynamic basis. They ﬁnd that capital requirements advo-
cated by the Basel Committee can be very eﬀective in curbing the risk of trading portfolio and
inducing truthful revelation of this risk.
8. Even so, many other reasons can also contribute to a practice of selling in a falling mar-
ket. Typical examples are positive feedback technical trading rules or stop-loss rules. MarginThis line of argument should be a serious source of concern given the
generalized trend toward risk-sensitive capital adequacy requirements.
The current revisions of the Basel credit risk charges, dubbed “Basel II,”
also go in the direction of more sensitive risk charges. The worry is that the
design of such capital-adequacy requirements might destabilize the ﬁnan-
cial system by inducing banks to tighten credit as credit risk increases—
precisely at the wrong time in a recession. This prospect of procyclicality is
an important issue facing bank regulation today. While it is beyond the
scope of this paper to discuss procyclicality of credit risk rules, the ques-
tion is whether this vicious circle argument does in fact apply to the mar-
ket risk charges.
This argument requires most VaR-constrained traders to start from sim-
ilar positions. Otherwise, they could simply cross their trades with little
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Fig. 1.1 The VaR vicious circle hypothesis
Source: Persaud (2000).
calls can also lead to liquidation sales after prices have fallen. Schinasi and Smith (2000) also
argue that the practice of rebalancing to ﬁxed weights with leverage creates similar trading
patterns.eﬀect on prices. Ultimately, positions cannot be directly compared, as
these data are proprietary and jealously guarded. Instead, we can examine
correlations in trading revenues.
1.2.3 Correlations in Positions and Returns
This section reviews empirical approaches to theories of herding. Real-
ized returns reﬂect positions and innovations in risk factors. Consider a
daily horizon indexed by t. Call x(i, t – 1) the dollar position on asset i at
the end of day t– 1. This is the number of units n(i, t– 1) times the unit value
S(i, t – 1). The position is assumed unchanged until the next day. Deﬁne
R(i, t – 1)   [S(i, t) – S(i, t – 1)]/S(i, t – 1) as the rate of return on the asset,
which is unitless. The dollar return on the position is then
x(i, t   1)R(i, t)   n(i, t   1)S(i, t   1)R(i, t).
Contemporaneous correlations across portfolios can arise for a number of
reasons. With ﬁxed positions, correlations in dollar returns can arise be-
cause of correlations in the risk factors (R). Or, correlations could occur
because positions change together (n). This could reﬂect herding.
It is axiomatic that every trade has a buyer and seller. Herding therefore
must refer to a subset of participants; for example, ﬁnancial institutions. It
is often thought that institutions are more likely to herd because their in-
formation set may be more homogeneous. Information-based herding im-
plies that movements in the positions depend on actions of other investors k
(2)  n(i, t)   f[ nk(i, t) . . .],
which should be reﬂected in positive correlations. Herding implies buying
or selling an asset when others are doing the same. One class of herding
models emphasizes information asymmetries as the source of herding. In-
vestors may imitate the transactions of others whom they think have a spe-
cial information advantage.
Tests of herding usually focus on portfolio positions for a subgroup of in-
vestors. Unfortunately, these tests are contaminated by other eﬀects. Port-
folio positions could change together because of common new informa-
tion I:
(3a)  n(i, t)   f [I(i, t   1) . . .].
For instance, a positive shock to interest rates may make stocks less at-
tractive, leading to simultaneous sales by many investors. Alternatively,
correlations in portfolio adjustments could be due to similar trading pat-
terns. Technical trading rules, for instance, are deﬁned as movements in the
positions that depend on previous movements in the risk factor
(3b)  n(i, t)   f [R(i, t   1) . . .].
34 Philippe JorionAs an example, momentum investors will tend to buy an asset that just went
up in value. This creates positive correlations across momentum investors,
which has nothing to do with herding. Alternatively, arbitrage trading can
take place if the current basis, or diﬀerence between the cash and forward
prices S and F, is out of line with the cash-and-carry relationship. Arbi-
trageurs will buy the cheap asset at the same time, creating positive corre-
lations across their positions that have nothing to do with herding:
(3c)  n(i, t)   f [S(i, t   1), F(i, t   1) . . .].
Empirical tests are bedeviled by this contamination eﬀect. Among oth-
ers, Kodres and Pritsker (1996) examine the behavior of institutional in-
vestors with large positions on major U.S. futures contracts. They compute
correlations between changes in daily positions within each group (broker-
dealers, pension funds, commercial banks, foreign banks, and hedge funds).
For a ﬁxed contract i and two investors k and l within the same group, this
is measured as
(4)  [ nk(i, t),  nl(i, t)].
They report that average correlations within each group are close to
zero, with a range of –0.30 to  0.34. This provides no evidence of herding.
Even with positive correlations, however, these results would have been
diﬃcult to interpret, because common movements could be due to similar
trading strategies; for example, momentum strategies or stock-index arbi-
trage for broker-dealers, as explained previously.
Alternatively, constraint-based herding theories can be tested by exam-
ining correlations among trading returns directly (or xR). The VaR vicious
circle hypothesis postulates that banks start from similar positions because
they are forced to sell similar positions after the VaR limits are hit. If so,
correlations among ex post trading revenues and ex ante risk measures
based on VaR forecasts should be high. But ﬁrst, the issue is whether large-
scale VaR models successfully predict the risk of trading portfolios.
1.2.4 Empirical Evidence on VaR and Trading Revenues
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) provide the ﬁrst empirical study of the ac-
curacy of banks’ internal VaR models. Their paper uses daily VaR and trad-
ing revenue data for six U.S. commercial banks over the period January
1998 to March 2000, or approximately 500 trading days. The data are con-
ﬁdential because they are provided in the course of the bank’s regulatory
examinations. To preserve the conﬁdential nature of the data, the numbers
are scaled, which makes it impossible to conduct cross-sectional tests.
Instead, the authors perform time-series tests of unconditional and con-
ditional coverage. Their main conclusion is that, relative to their actual
P&L, banks report VaR measures that are conservative, or too large. For
four out of six banks, the average VaR is 1.6 to 3 times the actual 99th per-
Bank Trading Risk and Systemic Risk 35centile of the P&L distribution. Put diﬀerently, the number of exceptions is
too low. Only one bank had more than three exceptions over this period,
when the expected number was ﬁve. Furthermore, most of these exceptions
occurred during a short period, from August to October 1998. These re-
sults are surprising because they imply that the banks’ VaR, and hence
their market risk charge, is too high. Banks therefore allocate too much
regulatory capital to their trading activities.
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) give two explanations for this observa-
tion. First, P&L include not only changes in mark-to-market positions, but
also income from market-making activities, such as fees and spread, as well
as net interest income. This increases the P&L, reducing the number of vi-
olations.9In theory, VaR should be measured against hypothetical income,
taken as the change in the market value of a frozen portfolio, ignoring
other eﬀects. This is in fact the procedure in place in Germany. Jaschke,
Stahl, and Stehle (2003) also compare the VaRs for thirteen German banks
to the 99th percentile. They ﬁnd that these VaR measures are, on average,
less conservative than with U.S. data.10
Second, they report that some VaR models are obtained by aggregating
diﬀerent sectors without taking correlations into account. By neglecting
diversiﬁcation eﬀects, this practice overestimates VaR. These drawbacks,
however, are straightforward to correct by the internal-risk measurement
system. By doing so, the banks would be releasing additional risk capital,
or alternatively could be taking on more trading risk with the same amount
of capital.11 We would also expect VaR models to improve over time.
Yet another explanation is that capital requirements are currently not
binding. The amount of economic capital U.S. banks currently hold is in
excess of their regulatory capital. As a result, banks prefer to report high
VaR numbers so as to avoid the possibility of regulatory intrusion. This is
possible because the market risk capital represents a small fraction—
about only two percent—of total regulatory capital.12 Still, these practices
impoverish the informational content of VaR numbers.
36 Philippe Jorion
9. On the other hand, intraday trading will typically increase the portfolio risk relative to
close-to-close positions because trading positions are typically cut down toward the close of
the day.
10. Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) ﬁnd that 83 percent of their banks reported higher val-
ues of VaRs, which exceeded the 99th percentile by an average of 70 percent. In contrast,
Jaschke, Stahl, and Stehle (2003) ﬁnd that 67 percent of their banks had higher values of
VaRs, which were on average actually less than the 99th percentile by 4 percent. So, VaR mea-
sures are less biased when using hypothetical P&L measures.
11. Ewerhart (2002) advances another explanation attributed to adverse selection. Assum-
ing all banks are well capitalized, banks can be separated into prudent and less prudent ones.
Because the regulator cannot diﬀerentiate among banks, more prudent ones have an incen-
tive to report conservative capital requirements.
12. Hirtle (2003) reports a median ratio of MRC to total capital requirement of approxi-
mately 1.9 percent for large U.S. banks.Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) also ﬁnd that a simple generalized auto-
regressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) model appears to cap-
ture risk much better than the banks’ structural models. This is not aston-
ishing, however, because the one-year observation period requirement
imposed by the Basel rules disallows fast-moving GARCH models and
leads to slowly changing capital requirements.13
This analysis, however, is limited in time and ignores cross-sectional in-
formation. Using daily data also has drawbacks. GARCH processes decay
relatively fast. Christoﬀersen and Diebold (2000) show that there is scant
evidence of volatility predictability at horizons longer than ten days.14
Thus, there is little point in forecasting time variation in volatility over
longer horizons. In addition, daily marking-to-market introduces pricing
errors for illiquid positions and positions across time zones that tend to dis-
appear over longer horizons. Finally, daily data are provided for total trad-
ing revenues and are not disaggregated at the level of business lines.
Instead, Jorion (2002b) analyzes the informativeness of quarterly VaR
numbers disclosed in ﬁnancial reports. These are the only numbers avail-
able to the public. VaR measures appear to be useful forecasts of trading
risks, especially in cross-sections. Time-series results for individual banks
are less strong. VaR forecasts are signiﬁcant only for four out of the eight
banks in the sample.
Yet another approach is to focus directly on the market risk charge, as
described in equation (1). Hirtle (2003) ﬁnds that market risk charges
(MRCs) provide useful information about future trading risks. The MRC,
however, diﬀers from end-of-period VaR because of the averaging process,
changes in the multiplier, and in the speciﬁc risk charge.
The current paper also focuses on movements in market risk charges.
Commonalities in positions should be reﬂected in high correlations in
changes in MRCs across banks. The paper will also examine correlations
across trading revenues. Apparently the only other paper that deals with
this issue is that by Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002), who report an average
correlation of 0.17 only over the period January 1998 to March 2000. They
also indicate that these correlations double over a ﬁve-day horizon. This is
why it is useful to examine a quarterly horizon, a longer sample period, and
diﬀerent types of trading activities.
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13. See Jorion (2002a) for a description of the movements in the market risk charge. The
standard RiskMetrics model, for instance, based on exponentially weighted moving average
volatility forecast, is not Basel compliant because it places too much weight on recent data.
14. This conclusion is based on daily forecasts, which tend to lose forecasting power after
more than ﬁfteen days. Andersen et al. (chapter 11, this volume), however, show that realized
volatility, based on intraday data, is highly persistent up to sixty days.1.3 Empirical Evidence
1.3.1 Data Sample
This study uses trading income and risk data reported by large U.S. bank
holding companies (BHC) to the Federal Reserve. All BHCs ﬁle quarterly
balance sheet and income statement reports on forms Y-9C. Trading in-
come is reported on Schedule HI, consolidated income statement, and the
MRC is reported on Schedule HC-R, regulatory capital. These are large,
internationally active banks that are most likely to raise systemic risk con-
cerns.
An advantage of this dataset is that the MRC data are measured consis-
tently across institutions, using the same parameters, and are reported as
quarter-end ﬁgures. Banks also report VaR data in their quarterly and an-
nual reports ﬁled with the SEC. These ﬁnancial reports often have more de-
tail by risk categories but are less consistent across banks and across time.
Banks diﬀer in their choice of conﬁdence level and in their reporting of
quarter-average or quarter-end ﬁgures. In addition, the BHC database is
more comprehensive, as it covers institutions that do not ﬁle SEC reports.
The database reports quarterly MRC data starting in March 1998 and
ending in September 2003.15In addition, we collect total assets, equity, trad-
ing assets and liabilities, derivatives notional, and total trading revenues.
Trading revenues are broken down into ﬁxed-income, currency, equity, 
and commodity categories. The detailed trading revenue series start in
March 1995.
There is a total of forty BHCs that have nonzero entries in the MRC data
ﬁeld over the 1998–2003 sample period. For the correlation analysis, this
study requires a continuous sample over the same period. Hence, the
sample is restricted to the eleven BHCs with complete histories over the
1998–2003 period. This is the most important group, anyway. It accounts
for 95 percent of the value of the aggregate market risk charge in March
1998 and 92 percent at the end of the period.
Mergers and acquisitions, however, are frequent occurrences that re-
quire special treatment. We reconstructed the time series of the merged en-
tity by adding up the series for the separate institutions. For instance, total
assets for JP Morgan Chase before September 2000 are taken as the sum of
assets for the two banks before the merger. This is only an approximation,
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15. In practice, the MRC is reported as a market risk equivalent asset ﬁgure, which is the
MRC divided by 8 percent. The rationale for this is that the market risk charge is added to the
credit risk charge, which is taken as 8 percent of (credit) risk-weighted assets. Thus, adding
the market risk equivalent asset ﬁgure to the (credit) risk-weighted assets gives a single num-
ber, which after multiplication by 8 percent gives the total minimum capital requirement. For
our purposes, the numbers we report are the reported market risk equivalent assets (item
1651) multiplied by 8 percent and translated into millions of dollars.because it ignores transactions between the two banks. This procedure also
overestimates the VaR of the merged entity, which is likely to be less than
the sum of the separate VaRs, due to diversiﬁcation eﬀects.16 This proce-
dure is conservative, however, for the purpose of measuring the informa-
tion content of VaR.
1.3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 displays the eleven BHCs with a complete time-series history
over the twenty-three quarters.17 Over this ﬁve-year period, nearly all
banks have increased in size. Total assets have grown by 34 percent, equity
by 56 percent, and derivatives notional amounts by 118 percent. The ma-
jor exception is Deutsche Bankers Trust (DBT), whose operations were
wound down after its acquisition by Deutsche Bank.
Table 1.2displays trading position data for the bank sample. It shows the
size of trading assets, trading liabilities, and of the MRC. Comparing the
two tables, we see that trading assets account for approximately 14 percent
of total assets as of 2002. Three banks, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of Amer-
ica, and DBT, have large trading operations in terms of relative size of trad-
ing assets. Overall, trading liabilities amount to approximately half of trad-
ing assets. These numbers, however, like derivatives notional amounts, are
not very informative, because they fail to capture the risk and correlations
of positions, which is better measured by the MRC.
1.3.3 The Market Risk Charge
We now turn to the description of the market risk charge. This amounted
to $6.7 billion in total for these eleven banks as of 2002. In relation to total
assets or equity, however, this is a small number. The MRC averages about
1.4 percent of total trading assets, or 2.4 percent of total book equity. This
masks diﬀerences across banks, however. As of December 2002 JP Morgan
Chase and Bank of America had the biggest trading operations, with an
MRC/equity ratio of 6.3 percent and 4.6 percent, respectively. At the other
extreme, Keycorp’s MRC is only 0.2 percent of equity.
The aggregate MRC hardly changed over this ﬁve-year period, increas-
ing from $6.5 to only $6.7 billion. This number, however, is mainly driven
by large banks, and is partly oﬀset by a large drop in the MRC for DBT.
Figure 1.2 displays the MRC for all eleven banks. Apart from DBT, MRCs
steadily increase over time. Some banks with low initial MRC, such as Mel-
lon Bank, State Street, and Wells Fargo, do increase their market risk sub-
stantiallyin relative terms. To abstract from size, we compound the average
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16. Strictly speaking, the VaR of a portfolio can only be less than the sum of the individual
VaRs for elliptical distributions. Artzner et al. (2001) show pathological cases where this so-
called coherence property is not satisﬁed.
17. This sample includes all eight banks analyzed by Jorion (2002b), of which two disap-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.of the quarterly rate of growth for various series across banks. Figure 1.3
compares the growth of the MRC, trading assets, bank equity, and bank as-
sets. For the average bank, trading has become more important over the
last f ﬁve years.18
We now examine the time-series behavior of the MRC, an ex ante mea-
sure of risk. Table 1.3 displays the quarterly relative change in the MRC,
along with the value-weighted and equally weighted averages across banks.
The bottom of the ﬁrst panel displays the mean and standard deviation of
each time series. Note that the mean is systematically smaller than the stan-
dard deviation. For JP Morgan Chase, for instance, the mean is 7.0 per-
cent, and the standard deviation 23.9 percent. As a result, tests have little
statistical power. The t-statistics do not allow us to reject the hypothesis of
zero mean change in the MRC.19
Since some observers have blamed VaR for the volatility experienced in
the third quarter of 1998, we would expect to see a sharp increase in the ag-
gregate VaR from June to September 1998. Instead, the relative change in
total VaR is only 4.5 percent, which is within the range of typical ﬂuctua-
tions in VaR. There is no evidence that the market risk charge went up
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18. This could be explained by an increase in general market risk, as measured by VaR, or
in speciﬁc risk. Casual observation from annual reports, however, indicates that these banks
have increased their VaR over this period. See the Financial Times (March 25, 2004), “The
balancing act that is Value at Risk.”
19. The only exception is Mellon Bank, for which the t-statistic is 2.1.
Fig. 1.2 Market risk charge (millions of dollars)sharply during this period. Perhaps market volatility went up and positions
were cut, however.
Finally, the bottom of table 1.3 displays the correlation matrix between
changes in VaR. The average correlation is –0.033, which is close to zero.20
Only one correlation among the ﬁfty-ﬁve entries is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. This highest correlation is 0.625, between Citicorp and DBT. The
correlation between the two biggest trading operations, JP Morgan (JPM)
Chase and Bank of America (BofA), is 0.302, which is still small. Thus, a
single high correlation is not evidence of general VaR-induced herding.
To assess the economic implication of diversiﬁcation eﬀects, we can
compare volatility measures under diﬀerent assumptions. Deﬁne xi as the
variable of interest, say the relative change in the MRC. The volatility of the
average (equally weighted) is derived from:
(5)  2 (1/N) ∑ xi    (1/N)2 ∑
i
 i
2   2 ∑
i ∑
i j
 i  j ij 
The volatility of the average, which is shown in the last column, is only 7.8
percent.
We can then compare this volatility with what we would obtain under
Bank Trading Risk and Systemic Risk 43
20. The pairwise correlation coeﬃcients are not independent because the correlation ma-
trix must obey positive-deﬁniteness conditions. We also report the average of positive entries
and the average of negative entries. These must obviously be greater than the grand average,
and reﬂect the average correlation between banks that have positive or negative correlations.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ldiﬀerent correlation scenarios. With perfect correlations, equation (5)
simpliﬁes to a volatility measured as (1/N)[Σi  i], which is the average of
volatilities across banks. This is 29.9 percent in our sample, which is much
greater than what we observe. On the other hand, with zero correlations,
the volatility of the average should be (1/N)[Σi  i
2]1/2, which is 10.2 percent
in our sample. The fact that the actual volatility of 7.8 percent is even lower
than this last number reﬂects the many negative correlations across series.
In other words, there seems to be substantial idiosyncratic movement in
the market risk charge. Thus, there is no support for the hypothesis that
VaR measures move strongly together.
1.3.4 Trading Revenues
Next, table 1.4 reports measures of trading revenues. The ﬁrst column
reports the average annual trading revenue in dollars. This is annualized 
by multiplying the quarterly average by four. The numbers are all positive
but are hard to compare to each other because the scale of the operations
are so diﬀerent. Instead, the second column reports the average of the
quarterly trading revenue deﬂated by beginning-of-quarter trading assets,
which is similar to a return-on-assets measure (rather, revenue-on-assets,
since expenses are not taken into account). The range of values is striking.
Many banks return less than 5 percent. Two banks, however, return more
than 10 percent. These banks, Mellon Financial and State Street, have rel-
atively small values for trading assets.
The next column deﬂates trading revenues by book equity instead, giv-
ing a metric similar to return-on-equity. This is also an incomplete mea-
sure, because equity supports not only market risk but also other risks.
Here also, there is a wide dispersion in ratios. The ordering of banks is gen-
erally similar to that in the previous column, except for JP Morgan Chase,
which now ranks with the highest ratio, because the bank has a large trad-
ing operation relative to its other activities.
We verify whether these results still hold when using the market risk
charge as the denominator instead of trading assets. The next column re-
ports the average of trading revenue deﬂated by the beginning-of-quarter
MRC, which can be interpreted as the economic risk capital required to
support the trading activity. The ratios are all very high, reaching 1,069
percent per annum for State Street. The ratio for the total is 184 percent.
Even after deduction of expenses, these ratios seem high.
Assume for instance that costs account for 80 percent of revenues, which
is a high but conservative number.21 This gives a net return before taxes to
the MRC of 184 percent  (1 – 80 percent)  37 percent, which is still very
46 Philippe Jorion
21. Goldman Sachs, for example, reports segment information for proprietary trading.
Over the last three years, operating expenses for this segment ranged from 66 percent to 76






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.high. For Citicorp, for instance, the table implies a net return on MRC of
852 percent   (1 – 80 percent)   170 percent. This is much higher than its
total return to equity of about 30 percent over recent years. For this
sample, seven out of eleven banks show a ratio of trading revenue to MRC
above 184 percent. Either proprietary trading has been very proﬁtable over
these years, or the MRC is too low as a measure of economic capital.
The right side of table 1.4 decomposes trading revenues into its four cat-
egories. Based on total dollar revenues, ﬁxed-income trading accounts for
35 percent of the total; currency trading accounts for 45 percent, equity
trading for 16 percent, and commodity trading for 4 percent. Smaller
banks tend to specialize in currency and ﬁxed-income trading and are 
thus less diversiﬁed.
Next we turn to a correlation analysis of trading revenues. To increase
the sample size, the analysis starts in March 1995, for a total of thirty-ﬁve
quarters instead of twenty-three as in the previous sample. Trading rev-
enues are deﬂated by trading assets at the beginning of each quarter to pro-
duce a rate of return. Table 1.5 presents the volatility of scaled trading rev-
enues and their correlations. The next-to-last column is the total aggregate
number. This is a value-weighted aggregate obtained by scaling the total
dollar trading revenues by total dollar trading assets. The last column rep-
resents the arithmetic, or equally-weighted average for the eleven banks.
The table shows that correlations are generally low. The average correla-
tion is only 0.163, which does not support a generalized theory of herding.
Note that there is substantial imprecision in these numbers. Under the null
of zero correlation, for example, the standard error is 0.177. Thus, there is
no evidence that trading activities for these banks are highly correlated, on
average. Even the average of positive values is still relatively low, at 0.275;
the average of negative entries is –0.167, which is also low. The main ex-
ception is for the two largest trading operations, JPM Chase and BofA,
which have a high correlation coeﬃcient of 0.709. These banks account for
52 percent and 17 percent, respectively, of total trading assets for this
sample. So the two largest banks in the sample have commonalities in trad-
ing revenues. This might be a source of concern but still does not create sys-
temic risk, as market risk represents only a small fraction of the risks in-
curred by U.S. commercial banks.
Figure 1.4 plots the quarterly scaled trading revenue for the industry as
a whole. The top line represents the equal-weighted average, the bottom
line the value-weighted average. The equal-weighted average is higher, re-
ﬂecting the higher proﬁtability of smaller banks when scaling by trading
assets. The value-weighted index drops to a slightly negative value only
once, during the third quarter of 1998. This reﬂects the losses suﬀered by
the larger banks during the LTCM crisis. The equal-weighted index, how-
ever, only registers a small drop during this quarter.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.average volatility and the volatility of the equally-weighted average. The
average volatility, which assumes no diversiﬁcation eﬀects, is 1.13 percent.
If the series were totally uncorrelated, the volatility of an equally-weighted
portfolio should be 0.46 percent. Instead, the volatility of the average,
which is shown in the last column, is only 0.64 percent. This number is
slightly higher than the uncorrelated volatility but still much lower than the
undiversiﬁed volatility of 1.13 percent, conﬁrming that the trading risk of
the commercial banking system is rather well diversiﬁed, on average.
Perhaps these results mask high correlations for some categories of trad-
ing. To check this, table 1.6 provides a more detailed analysis by trading
category. The bottom of the table describes the distribution of correlation
coeﬃcients for ﬁxed-income, currency, equity, and commodity trading.22
The averages are all low, ranging from –0.039 to 0.149, indicating little
commonality in trading positions within each category. Even the ﬁxed-
income positions, often thought to be similar to those assumed by LTCM,
have low correlations.23 Equity trading portfolios have the highest correla-
tion, which averages 0.149, still a low number.
Table 1.6 also shows diversiﬁcation eﬀects across categories for each
50 Philippe Jorion
22. Not all banks engage in trading activities across all categories. All banks were active in
ﬁxed-income and currencies, but only eight banks report equity trading, and nine banks re-
port commodity trading.
23. Notably, JPM Chase and BofA have a correlation of 0.512, 0.157, 0.680, and 0.322, for
ﬁxed-income, currency, equity, and commodity risk, respectively. So, the high correlation of
0.709 for their total trading is not driven by ﬁxed-income positions alone. Note that because
correlations are not linear operators the correlation for the sum may be greater than the cor-
relations for the four business lines.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.bank. The risk decomposition panel lists volatilities scaled as a percentage
of each bank’s total trading risk. The ﬁrst four categories correspond to the
individual risk of each trading line. For JPM Chase, for instance, the trad-
ing risk is 62.6 percent of the total for ﬁxed-income, 29.6 percent for cur-
rencies, 34.5 percent for equities, and 30.0 percent for commodities. These
numbers are representative of the industry as a whole, with more trading
risk coming from ﬁxed-income products. These numbers sum to an undi-
versiﬁed risk of 156.7 percent of the actual risk. The diﬀerence, or 56.7 per-
cent, is a diversiﬁcation eﬀect. The table shows substantial diversiﬁcation
eﬀects across trading categories. The average diversiﬁcation eﬀect across
banks is 74 percent. This eﬀect is visually conﬁrmed by ﬁgure 1.5, which
shows that the four components of the equally-weighted bank index be-
have relatively independently of each other. Thus, these banks are fairly di-
versiﬁed across risk categories.
Next, we provide a direct test of the hypothesis that the risk of trading
portfolio has increased since the internal models approach, based on VaR,
was put in place in 1998. Table 1.7compares the volatility of scaled trading
revenues before and after 1998. The evidence is inconclusive. Six banks had
increased risk, ﬁve had lower risk, a few signiﬁcantly so in either direction.
Based on the value-weighted data, trading risk seems to have increased.
Based on an equal-weighted portfolio, however, volatility went down post-
1998. Similarly, the average of individual volatilities dropped from 0.0128
to 0.0084 in the post-1998 period. This does not suggest the average volatil-
ity of trading bank portfolios has increased over time.
52 Philippe Jorion























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Finally, table 1.8 revisits the trading performance of this bank sample,
now adjusting for risk. The cross-sectional average of mean scaled trading
revenues was 7.68 percent and the average volatility was 2.27 percent. The
last columns show that these correspond to very high Sharpe ratios. The
average Sharpe ratio based on dollars trading revenues is 3.54 for this
sample (from the cross-sectional average of the average trading revenue
divided by its volatility). Using trading revenues scaled by trading assets
gives a similar ratio of 3.42. These numbers are much higher than the
Sharpe ratio of 1.30 for an aggregate hedge fund index reported by Asness,
Krail, and Liew (2001), although they do not take costs into account.24
Perhaps these results are due to the shape of distribution of trading rev-
enues. Table 1.8 also reports skewness and excess kurtosis. The average skew-
ness is close to zero; none is signiﬁcant. Excess kurtosis is generally posi-
tive, with four signiﬁcant entries. These numbers are similar to those for
hedge funds. Even so, risk adjustments based on volatility alone should be
viewed with caution, as they ignore tail risks.
These results are in line with those of Kwan (1997). He ﬁnds that trading
is more proﬁtable, but riskier, than banking activities.25 Interestingly, he
also reports that trading by primary dealer subsidiaries, which overlap
with the large banks in our sample, has a negative correlation with bank-
ing activities, providing diversiﬁcation beneﬁts to bank holding compa-
nies. No doubt this explains the increased focus on proprietary trading.
1.4 Conclusions
VaR systems and the discipline of risk-sensitive capital charges have fo-
cused the attention of ﬁnancial institutions on improving risk management
practices. No doubt this helps explain the resilience of the banking system
in the face of the recent recession and ever-bigger corporate and sovereign
defaults. A nagging concern, however, is whether the generalized use of
these techniques could increase volatility in ﬁnancial markets.
This study provides a ﬁrst attempt at addressing this issue. In the absence
of position data, it relies on the time-series behavior of market risk charges
and trading revenues broken down by line of activity. This analysis must be
qualiﬁed, however, by the use of quarterly returns that could mask the risk
of proprietary trading portfolios, which follow dynamic trading strategies
with even higher turnover than hedge funds. In addition, the relatively
short sample periods do not allow investigating correlations in the tails,
which may be diﬀerent from the average correlations used here.
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24. The data are over a similar period, January 1994 to September 2000. The Sharpe ratio
for the S&P index is 1.39, also expressed in raw rather than excess returns.
25. Over the period 1990.II to 1997.II. Kwan (1997) reports average trading revenues over
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Nevertheless, the overall picture from these preliminary results is that
there is a fair amount of diversiﬁcation across banks, and within banks
across business lines. There is also no evidence that the post-1998 period
has witnessed an increase in volatility. Thus, arguments that bank trading
and VaR systems contribute to volatility due to similar positions has no
empirical support. As Fed Vice-Chairman Roger Ferguson (2002) said in
a recent speech, these concerns seem “overestimated.”
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